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Productive inefficiency analysis and toxic chemical substances in US 
and Japanese manufacturing sectors 
Hidemichi Fujii, Shunsuke Managi 
 
Abstract Corporate social responsibility is imperative for manufacturing companies to achieve 
sustainable development. Under a strong environmental information disclosure system, polluting 
companies are disadvantaged in terms of market competitiveness because they lack an 
environmentally friendly image. The objective of this study is to analyze the productive inefficiency 
change in relation to toxic chemical substance emissions for the US and Japan and their 
corresponding policies. We apply the weighted Russell directional distance model to measure 
companies’ productive inefficiency which represents their production technology. The data 
encompass 330 US manufacturing firms observed from 1999 to 2007, and 466 Japanese 
manufacturing firms observed from 2001 to 2008. This paper focuses on nine high-pollution 
industries (rubber and plastics; chemicals and allied products; paper and pulp; steel and nonferrous 
metal; fabricated metal; industrial machinery; electrical products; transportation equipment; 
precision instruments) categorized into two industry groups: basic materials industries and 
processing and assembly industries. The results show that the productive inefficiency decreased in 
all industrial sectors in the US and Japan from 2001 to 2007. In particular, that of the electrical 
products industry decreased rapidly after 2002 for both countries, possibly because of the 
enforcement of strict environmental regulations for electrical products exported to European 
markets. 
 
Keywords: productive inefficiency; weighted Russell directional distance model; toxic chemical 
substances; manufacturing sector; United States; Japan 
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Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility is imperative for manufacturing companies to achieve 
sustainable development. Although companies engage in production activity to achieve 
the key objective of economic development, the production processes of manufacturing 
companies generate a significant amount of environmental pollution. In many cases, the 
environmental burden generated by certain production processes depends on the design 
of products and services. 
The best-known definition of sustainable development is that given by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), which promotes closer links 
between the environment and development. The Brundtland report, Our Common 
Future (WCED, 1987), defines sustainable development as “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”. This definition is rather indefinite and raises more questions than it 
answers. A more precise definition would be, for example, development that requires 
utility levels, resource stocks, or total capital stocks, including natural capital and 
human capital, to be nondecreasing over time. Thus, sustainable paths tackle standard 
optimal solutions as formalized in the traditional theory of economic growth (Akao and 
Managi, 2007). 
A key element in sustainable development is a decrease in productive inefficiency. 
Productive inefficiency relates to the use of resources in production. Manufacturing 
firms use several resources as inputs, including labor, capital, and intermediate products. 
The allocation of resources and strategy differs between companies, and these resource 
allocation differences generate productive inefficiency (Fujii et al, 2010). Productive 
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inefficiency contributes to the consumption of more intermediate materials than needed 
for production, which generates additional environmental pollutants by the 
manufacturing companies. Thus, continuous productive inefficiency decrease (or 
efficiency increase), which includes pollution reductions, is important for achieving 
sustainable development. Against this background, this study analyzes productive 
inefficiency in light of environmental policies on the provision and dissemination of 
environmental information in the US and Japan. 
The principal task of this study is to measure productive inefficiency and 
decompose it into input factor inefficiency, desirable output factor inefficiency, and 
undesirable output factor inefficiency. It is important to note that we cannot judge 
whether the inefficiency decreases over time a priori. This is because regulations 
requiring more stringent pollution abatement do not necessarily change the productive 
inefficiency1.  
This study targets US and Japanese manufacturing firms for three reasons. First, 
they are large emitters. In 2008, the US and Japanese industrial sectors emitted 3.85 
billion and 0.44 billion pounds of chemical substances, respectively - amounts that are 
larger than for any other developed country. As Lanjouw and Mody (1996) noted, the 
US and Japan spend large amounts on research and development for environmentally 
desirable technology, and both countries have a high ratio of environmental patents to 
the total number of patents. Second, for both countries, pollution abatement costs and 
expenditures make up large shares of the GDP. Finally, the US and Japanese 
governments provide free pollution release and transfer register (PRTR) information for 
companies on their websites, thus ensuring easy dissemination of environmental 
information to the public. This study considers the differences between industries and 
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compares the productive inefficiencies for nine manufacturing industries in the US and 
Japan. 
We begin by providing background information about the PRTR system in the US 
and Japan. We then introduce some related literature on productive inefficiency analysis 
and methodology. Following that, we explain our data and discuss the results. The final 
section presents further discussion and concluding remarks. 
Background 
In 1984, there was an accidental explosion at a pesticide plant in India; not long 
afterward, there was a leak at a US chemical plant. These accidents triggered an 
international movement to better understand the use of toxic chemical substances. 
Demand for information on toxic chemicals being released outside of the facilities was 
accelerated by public interest and environmental organizations (Khanna et al, 1998). 
This led to the enactment of the US Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986, which established the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) is a publicly available US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) database that 
contains information on toxic chemical releases reported annually by both certain 
industries and federal facilities2. 
The PRTR system in Japan has been in force since 2001, with the first public 
release of PRTR data on March 20, 2003. Under the PRTR system, facilities that have 
more than 20 employees and produce or use chemicals on a list of 354 substances 
specified by the law must annually report their quantities to the central government. The 
central government aggregates and sorts the reported data by industry type and 
geographic location, and the aggregated information is then provided to the public. The 
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PRTR in Japan has an important role in reducing and managing the development of 
toxic chemicals. 
We provide a historical review of environmental regulations dealing with toxic 
chemical substances in the US and Japan in Table 1. As shown in the table, Japan’s 
pollution restriction laws date back to the end of the 1960s, whereas the US was 
enforcing such laws in the 1940s and 1950s. In the US in 1986, the EPCRA established 
the TRI; the US government went on to implement a unique plan known as the 33/50 
Program, launched in 1991. The 33/50 Program targeted 17 priority chemicals, 
including toluene and benzene, and set a goal of a 33% reduction in release and transfer 
of these chemicals by 1992 and a 50% reduction by 1995, measured against a 1988 
baseline. The primary purpose of this voluntary program was to demonstrate the 
benefits of voluntary partnerships. Many previous studies support the benefits of 
voluntary approaches in bringing about targeted reductions more quickly than would 
regulations alone (e.g., Zatz and Harbour, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). From 2006, 
Japan started its volatile organic compounds (VOC) reduction plan, which has a target 
of a 30% reduction in release of VOC chemical substances, based on the voluntary 
effort of manufacturing firms and business associations. 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
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Literature Review and Methodology 
Literature review 
The issue of whether pollution abatement technologies are applied effectively is an 
important empirical question (Kolominskas and Sullivan, 2004). This is because the use 
of technology influences the production cost and pollution abatement cost and 
expenditures (e.g., Jaffe et al, 2005). There are two conflicting incentives that affect 
whether environmental regulations encourage or discourage decreases in productive 
inefficiency (Managi et al, 2005). On the one hand, abatement pressure might 
encourage productive inefficiency decreases that reduce the actual compliance costs to a 
level below those originally estimated (Bunge et al, 1996). On the other hand, firms 
might be unwilling to decrease their productive inefficiency if they believe regulators 
will respond by gradually tightening standards even further. In addition to changes in 
environmental standards and technology, environmental management levels affect 
productive inefficiency. Therefore, whether the productive inefficiency decreases over 
time is an empirical question (Managi et al, 2005). 
There is a range of empirical evidence on the link between pollution abatement 
technology and economic performance. Claver et al (2007) analyzed a single 
agricultural cooperative company in Spain in terms of the relationship between 
corporate environmental management (CEM) and economic performance; their results 
indicate that proactive CEM can enhance both environmental and economic 
performance. The literature on environmental standards and environmental innovations 
also covers various other situations, including automobile companies in France (Oltra 
and Saint-Jean, 2009) and appliance manufacturers in Germany (Kammerer, 2009). Two 
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types of studies that focus on productive inefficiency in relation to toxic chemical 
substances can be identified: one type focuses on the whole industrial sector, and the 
other examines firm-level data. If we apply data for the whole industrial sector to 
estimate productive inefficiency, the industry’s structural characteristics largely affect 
the productive inefficiency. In contrast, most studies that use firm-level data focus on 
only one industrial sector (e.g., Färe et al, 2001; Kwon, 2006; Koehler and Spengler, 
2007; Fujii et al, 2010; Fujii et al, 2011). Although in each country the PRTR system 
came into force for all industrial sectors in the same year, the technical difficulty of 
achieving reductions in emissions of toxic chemical substances differs between 
industries. In addition, it is clear that different industries require different capital 
equipment and labor to reduce toxic chemical substances, because the chemical 
products that are consumed as intermediate materials are different. We therefore 
compare the sector-level productive inefficiency in relation to emissions of toxic 
chemical substances. 
This study measures productive inefficiency in the US and Japanese 
manufacturing firms. We apply the weighted Russell directional distance model 
(WRDDM) to measure productive inefficiency using production technology following 
Chen et al (2011) and Barros et al (2011). They proposed a measure based on 
directional distance function, which is evaluated in linear form, and hence processes the 
attractive advantages of easy computation and easy extension of incorporating the 
additional undesirable outputs into the programming problems. 
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Methodology (WRDDM) 
Let inputs be denoted by NRx + , good outputs by 
MRy + , and bad or undesirable 
outputs by LRb + . The directional distance function seeking to increase the desirable 
outputs and decrease the undesirable outputs and inputs directionally can be defined by 
the following: 
 ( , , ; ) sup : ( , , )x y bD x y b g x g y g b g T   = − + −  , (1) 
where the nonzero vector ( , , )x y bg g g g= − −  determines the directions in which inputs, 
desirable outputs, and undesirable outputs are scaled. The technology reference set T = 
{(x, y, b): x can produce (y, b)} satisfies strong disposability of desirable outputs and 
inputs, and weak disposability of undesirable outputs. 
Suppose there are Jkj = ,,,1  decision-making units (DMUs) in the dataset. 
Each DMU uses inputs ( ) NN Rxxxx += ,,, 21  to jointly produce desirable outputs 
( ) MM Ryyyy += ,,, 21  and undesirable outputs ( ) LL Rbbbb += ,,, 21 . The WRDDM for 
inefficiency calculation of DMU k can be described as follows: 
D(x, y, b; g) = maximize (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘 +𝑁𝑛=1
1
𝑀
∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 +𝑀𝑚=1
1
𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑘𝐿
𝑙=1 ) (2) 
subject to 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑦𝑚𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑚𝑘 + 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 g𝑦𝑚𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (3) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑏𝑙𝑗 = 𝑏𝑙𝑘 − 𝛽𝑙
𝑘g𝑏𝑙𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (4) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑥𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑛𝑘 − 𝛽𝑛
𝑘g𝑥𝑛𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (5) 
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𝑍𝑗 ≥ 0,   𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑘, ⋯ , 𝐽, (6) 
where β𝑚
𝑘 , β𝑙
𝑘, and β𝑛
𝑘  are the individual inefficiency measures for desirable outputs, 
undesirable outputs, and inputs, respectively. Zk are the intensity variables to shrink or 
expand the individual observed activities of DMU k for the purpose of constructing 
convex combinations of the observed inputs and outputs. By setting g =
(−g𝑥𝑛𝑘, g𝑦𝑚𝑘 , −g𝑏𝑙𝑘) = (−𝑥𝑛𝑘, 𝑦𝑚𝑘, −𝑏𝑙𝑘), the WRDDM with variable returns to scale 
is shown as follows: 
D(x, y, b; g) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘 +𝑁𝑛=1
1
𝑀
∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 +𝑀𝑚=1
1
𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑘𝐿
𝑙=1 ) (7) 
subject to 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑦𝑚𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑚𝑘(1 + 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 )𝐽𝑗=1  (8) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑏𝑙𝑗 = 𝑏𝑙𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝑙
𝑘)𝐽𝑗=1  (9) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑥𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑛𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝑛
𝑘)𝐽𝑗=1  (10) 
𝑍𝑗 ≥ 0,   𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑘, ⋯ , 𝐽. (11) 
This type of directional vector assumes that an inefficient firm can decrease 
productive inefficiency while increasing desirable outputs and decreasing undesirable 
outputs and/or inputs in proportion to the initial combination of actual inputs and 
outputs. 
One of the strong points of the WRDDM is that it is able to determine each 
variable’s contribution ratio for inefficiency. This contribution ratio cannot be 
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determined in conventional productive inefficiency analysis. The contribution ratios 
enable us to discuss how and why each industry successfully decreased its productive 
inefficiency. 
Data and Results 
Data 
The financial dataset for the US firms comes from the Mergent Online financial 
database, and the chemical substances data are taken from the EPA’s TRI database. The 
financial dataset for the Japanese firms is provided by the Nikkei NEEDS financial 
database, and the chemical substances data are taken from the PRTR database from the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). Japanese manufacturing firm-level 
data cover the eight years from 2001 to 2008 and the US manufacturing data cover the 
nine years from 1999 to 2007. Data for 466 Japanese firms and 330 US firms were 
included (see Table 2). This paper focuses on nine industries: (1) chemicals; (2) 
fabricated metal; (3) pulp and paper; (4) rubber and plastics; (5) steel and nonferrous 
metal; (6) electrical products; (7) industrial machinery; (8) precision instruments; and 
(9) transportation equipment. We group these nine sectors into two categories: basic 
materials industries and processing and assembly industries (Table 2). 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
To analyze productive inefficiency, we use the following variables. Total revenue 
of the firm is used as the market output variable, and capital stock, number of 
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employees and intermediate material inputs are used as market input variables. These 
financial variables are deflated by the 2000 year price by type of industry. Deflators for 
the US firms are taken from the OECD database. Deflators for the Japanese firms come 
from the Statistics Bureau and the Bank of Japan database. The integrated toxic 
chemical substances risk score (toxic risk score), which is estimated by using the 
toxicity weight given by the US EPA, is used for undesirable outputs for productive 
inefficiency estimation. 
There are three limitations with our data. The first is related to the data coverage 
of firm data. The Mergent Online database provides consolidated financial data and, 
therefore, the TRI database includes parent company names. We used this code to 
integrate each plant’s toxic chemical substance emission data into consolidated 
company-level data. In contrast, the Japanese PRTR database does not include parent 
company names; it only includes nonconsolidated company names. We therefore 
integrated the Japanese PRTR data into nonconsolidated, company-level data. The 
second limitation is the difference in coverage of the number of chemical substances 
between the US and Japan. There are 426 chemical substances in the TRI database 
published by the US EPA, and the toxicity weight applies to all of them. In contrast, 
there are 354 chemical substances in the PRTR published by the METI in Japan, and the 
toxic weight applies to only 134 of them. This mismatching makes it difficult to 
compare the toxic risk scores directly. Therefore, we focus more on the time series of 
the productive inefficiency change in each country and industry. The third limitation is 
that, although we use capital stock data for the Japanese firm analysis, comprehensive 
capital stock data are not available for the US firms. We therefore apply net property 
plant and equipment as capital stock for the US firm analysis. In general, the value of 
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net property plant and equipment is lower than that of capital stock because, unlike 
capital stock, these items do not include intangible assets. 
The results are given in Figures 1 to 4 and Tables 3 and 4. The figures show the 
industrial average inefficiency score, and the tables show the industrial average 
contribution ratio for each inefficiency score. 
 
Results for the US industries 
From Figure 1, we find that the productive inefficiency of the fabricated metal industry 
increased from 1999 to 2000, and then decreased after 2000. However, the productive 
inefficiencies of the rubber and paper industries decreased from 2002 to 2007. The 
productive inefficiency of the steel industry did not change from 1999 to 2002, but 
subsequently it decreased. To examine these productive inefficiency results in more 
detail, we focus on the contribution ratio for the inefficiency score. As shown in Table 1, 
the rubber and chemical industries decreased their inefficiency scores without changing 
the combination ratio. This means that a decrease in productive inefficiency can be 
achieved by improving both use of input factors and production of outputs. The 
contribution ratio of the metal industry changed from 1999 to 2000, especially for 
capital, sale, and toxic. This change in contribution ratio implies that the main 
contributor toward the productive inefficiency score shifted from capital productivity to 
toxic chemical substance emission performance. We believe that the main reason the 
inefficiency score of the metal industry worsened is that the toxic risk score of chemical 
substance emissions from the metal industry increased. 
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We now discuss the results for the processing and assembly industries (see Figure 
2). Productive inefficiency decreased in all industries, showing a similar trend across the 
entire group from 1999 to 2007. Furthermore, the productive inefficiency decreased 
more rapidly in the processing and assembly industries than in the basic materials 
industries, especially in the electrical products and precision instruments industries. One 
explanation for this rapid decrease is that this period saw considerable technological 
innovations in the information technology field, which would have affected, for 
example, the semiconductor and the electronic components industry. In particular, 
processing and assembly companies invested large amounts of capital and expenditure 
in research and development to enable innovations and develop new products. 
Another reason for the decrease in productive inefficiency in the processing and 
assembly industries might be related to the enforcement of environmental standards in 
Europe. Because European environmental regulations stipulated threshold amounts of 
toxic chemical substances, electrical products exported from the US to Europe had to 
meet these restrictions in order to comply. Europe has three strict environmental 
standards for the processing and assembly industries: (1) restriction of the use of certain 
hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS); (2) end-of-life 
vehicles directive (ELV)3; and (3) registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH). Under the RoHS and ELV directives, no electrical or vehicle 
products that contain levels of toxic chemicals above the set amount can be sold in the 
European market. Because of these strict environmental standards, US firms that export 
to the European market had to promote toxic chemical substance management. 
Therefore, the decrease in productive inefficiency in the processing and assembly 
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industries was mainly driven by two factors: rapid technological advances and strict 
environmental standards in the European market. 
Further, the WRDDM result shows a poor financial performance by the 
transportation industry. One interpretation of this result is that environmentally 
proactive firms developed better toxic chemical substance management systems because 
of the new environmental standards, but that some firms may have chosen to retain their 
reactive environmental management to minimize the costs of environmental protection. 
This can arise because the TRI system does not actually regulate toxic chemical 
emissions. That is, firms that concentrate on the domestic market might have fewer 
incentives to reduce their emissions of toxic chemical substances. As the processing and 
assembly industries tend to export to the European market, they have incentives to 
manage their toxic chemicals proactively and must adjust to stringent environmental 
standards such as the RoHS and the ELV. These proactive firms reduce their 
consumption and emissions of toxic chemical substances efficiently. Therefore, firms 
that do not export to the global market might also be affected through supply chain 
management, although this effect is limited. Hence, firms’ perceptions of environmental 
preferences and environmental standards differ, which might be one reason why some 
firms manage toxic chemical substances well and others do not. Another explanation 
could be that the processing and assembly industries mainly use chemical substances for 
paint and bonding, and firms can reduce toxicity by replacing highly toxic chemicals 
with less toxic chemical materials. Although changing to less toxic chemical substances 
is costly, technological innovations can reduce the cost and resolve constraints such as 
bonding ability and color quality. Therefore, by introducing less toxic chemical 
materials, inefficient firms could achieve reduced toxicity. 
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<Figure 1 about here> 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Results for the Japanese industries 
From Figure 3, we find that the productive inefficiencies of five Japanese basic 
materials industries decreased from 2001 to 2007. In particular, the chemical industry’s 
productive inefficiency rapidly decreased. However, the productive inefficiencies of the 
steel and fabricated metal industries increased in 2008 because of the financial crisis. 
As Table 4 shows, the contribution ratio of toxic chemical substances increased 
from 2001 to 2008 in most industries. Furthermore, the productive inefficiency score, 
shown in Figure 3, decreased. This gives us to understand that the main contributor 
toward decreases in productive inefficiency was a reduction in emissions of toxic 
chemical substances. In examining the toxic chemical substances data in detail, we 
found that the level of VOC emissions fell more rapidly than those of other chemical 
substances, especially from 2006 to 2008, possibly because of the VOC restrictions 
introduced in 2006. Japan’s environmental standards establish seminars and workshops 
to help manufacturing companies and business associations reduce their use of VOC 
chemical substances. These activities support small- and medium-scale firms that tend 
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to experience difficulty in reducing their use of VOC chemical substances because they 
lack the necessary money and knowledge. 
The productive inefficiency of the rubber, chemical, and paper industries also 
decreased rapidly. In particular, the chemical industry greatly decreased its toxic risk 
score from 2001 to 2008, because of the proactive approach of the Japanese Chemical 
Industry Association (JCIA)4. The JCIA launched its own PRTR system as early as 1997 
to determine the amounts of toxic chemical substances emitted and moved. The JCIA 
also held workshops and seminars to spread their ideas for reducing toxic chemical 
substances effectively and cheaply among member firms. This progressive approach 
helped small-scale firms, which tended to be reactive to requirements to reduce 
emissions of toxic chemical substances, without straining their corporate financial 
performance. 
We now turn to the results for the Japanese processing and assembly industries 
(see Figure 4). This group of industries decreased their overall productive inefficiency 
from 2001 to 2008, especially the electrical products industry, which dramatically 
decreased its inefficiency. As noted for the US processing and assembly industries, these 
industries mainly use toxic chemical materials for paint and bonding, which can be 
replaced with less toxic chemical materials relatively easily. However, the toxic 
chemical materials used in the basic materials industries are very specific and hence 
difficult to replace. Consequently, processing and assembly industries have an 
advantage over basic materials industries in reducing their toxic risk scores. 
The REACH directive, which came into force in Europe in 2006, induces firms 
that export to the European market to be more proactive in their efforts to control toxic 
chemical substances. The REACH directive is planned to cover, by 2018, 30,000 
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chemical substances that firms treat at a volume of more than one tonne per year. To 
meet this stringent environmental standard while maintaining international market 
competitiveness, progressive firms must spread knowledge and solve problems together 
through seminars and workshops by all business associations. Furthermore, the REACH 
directive induces firms to develop comprehensive environmental management strategies 
through supply chain management and become more efficient in procuring 
environmentally friendly materials. 
A comparison of the results for the US and Japan reveals several points of 
difference. From Tables 3 and 4, we see that the combination of the contribution ratio of 
Japanese firms was different from that of US firms. In many Japanese industries, the 
contribution ratio of toxic increased whereas the contribution ratio of sale tended to 
decrease year by year. This implies that the main contributor toward the change in 
productive inefficiency switched from sale to toxic. One possible explanation for this is 
that the PRTR was introduced in Japan in 2001, and both efficient firms and inefficient 
firms were started on a steep learning curve for toxic chemical substance management 
(i.e., lower marginal pollution abatement). However, US manufacturing firms had more 
time to prepare for toxic chemical substance management because the TRI had been 
introduced there in 1986, and environmentally proactive firms might have already 
begun to apply cost-efficient pollution abatement technologies. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
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<Table 4 about here> 
 
Conclusion 
Corporate social responsibility is an important concept for companies seeking to 
achieve a balance between their economic development and environmental protection. 
In particular, toxic chemical substance management has become a higher-priority target 
for manufacturing firms since the discussion on biodiversity protection intensified at the 
Conferences of the Parties (COP). This study analyzed productive inefficiency in 
relation to emissions of toxic chemical substances, and compared the results for Japan 
and the US. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on changes in productive 
inefficiency. Environmental policy instruments that contain provisions on releasing 
information in pollutants have emerged in recent years as mainstream regulatory tools. 
To explore how such provisions provide firms with an incentive to improve their 
environmental performance, we analyzed and compared various industries’ 
environmental performance in terms of productive inefficiency. 
The main finding of this study is that productive inefficiency decreased in all 
sectors in the manufacturing industry in the US and Japan from 2001 to 2007. In 
particular, the productive inefficiency of the electrical products industry decreased 
rapidly after 2002. These decreases might be the result of enforcement of the RoHS and 
REACH directives in Europe. US and Japanese companies that export to the European 
market have strong incentives to manage toxic chemical substances in order to comply 
with the strict restrictions on toxic chemical substances. 
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This study contributes to the productive inefficiency literature in the following 
two points. First, the paper determines the contribution ratio for the productive 
inefficiency score by industrial sector, which has not been the focus of any previous 
research. The contribution ratio is useful for clarifying why and how productive 
inefficiency changes according to the types of input–output variables applied. Second, 
the paper measures productive inefficiency in terms of toxic chemical emissions by 
sector. Many previous studies used overall industry data without examining the 
particular characteristics of different sectors. It is important for policymakers and 
corporate decision makers to understand changes in productive inefficiency at the sector 
level because the labor input and pollution abatement equipment needed to reduce toxic 
chemical substances differ by sector. 
Corporate social responsibility is imperative for manufacturing firms seeking to 
to achieve sustainable development by balancing environmental pollution reduction and 
corporate financial performance. Future research is necessary to determine the multiple 
dimensions of environmental pollution, including CO2 emissions and resource 
consumption. 
 
Note 
1. This is so because the linear expansion of pollution abatement costs and pollution 
reduction does not necessarily change the pollution reduction per abatement cost 
(Pethig, 2006). 
2: Reports for the TRI must be filed by the owners and operators of facilities that meet 
all of the following criteria: (1) TRI reporting requirements are limited to 
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manufacturing facilities with major standard industrial classification (SIC) code 
groups 20 through 39. In 1997, the US EPA added another seven industry sectors to 
the TRI requirements. These sectors started to submit reports from 1998. (2) The 
number of full-time employees must be 10 (or the equivalent of 20,000 hours of 
work per year) or more. (3) Any facility that manufactured or processed more than 
25,000 pounds or otherwise used more than 10,000 pounds of a listed toxic chemical 
during the course of the calendar year is required to submit a report. 
3: The RoHS, REACH, and ELV were promulgated in 2003, 2006, and 2000 and came 
into force in 2006, 2007, and 2003, respectively. 
4: The Japan Chemical Industry Association (JCIA) has nearly 180 member companies, 
with 80 organizations engaged in the manufacturing and handling of chemical 
products and related services. The JCIA has actively undertaken activities to fulfill its 
mission of promoting the balance between economic development and environmental 
protection. 
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Table 1. History of law and regulation about toxic chemical substances 
Year Japan United State 
-1985 
- Basic Law for Environmental 
Pollution  (1967-1993) 
- Air Pollution Control Law (1968) 
- Water Pollution Control Law (1970) 
- Chemical Substances Control Law (1973) 
-Clean Water Act (1948) 
 (Revised in 1972,1977,1987) 
-Clean Air Act (1955) 
(Revised in 1970,1977,1990.) 
-Toxic Substances Control Act (1976) 
1985-1989 
-Amendment of chemical Substances 
Control Law (1986) 
-Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act was enacted (1986) 
-Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) started (1986) 
1990-1994 
- Law Concerning Special Measures for 
Total Emission Reduction of Nitrogen 
Oxides and Particulate Matte (1992) 
- Basic Environment Law (1993) 
- The Basic Environmental Plan (Define 
concept of environmental risk) (1994) 
-EPA establishes the 33/50 Program (1991) 
-Expansion of the chemical list raised the number of 
chemicals and chemical categories reported to TRI 
from 336 to over 600 (1994) 
1995-1999 
-  Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers 
Law [PRTR Law] (1999) 
-Facility/industry expansion1(1997) 
-Chemical Use Reporting2(1997) 
2000-2004 
- Law Concerning Special Measures against 
Dioxins (2000) 
-Amendment of Chemical Substances 
Control Law (2003) 
-EPA held an on-line public dialogue on options for 
reducing the burden on the regulated industry 
associated with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) 
program (2003) 
2005-2009 
- Amendment of Air Pollution Control 
Law [start restriction of VOC emission] 
(2006)  
- Basic Act on Biodiversity (2008) 
-
 
EPA revised the TRI reporting requirements to 
reduce burden and promote recycling and treatment as 
alternatives to disposal and other releases (2006) 
-
 
TRI Form A Eligibility Implementing the 2009 
Omnibus Appropriations Act (2009) 
Source: U.S. EPA homepage,
 
http://www.epa.gov/ 
Ministry of Environment, Japan homepage, http://www.env.go.jp/en/  
 
 
Table 2. Firms by industry type 
Industry type Type of business Code U.S. Japan 
Basic 
Material 
industry 
Chemicals and allied products CHEM 54 122 
Fabricated metal METAL 19 28 
Paper and Pulp PAPER 16 19 
Rubber and Plastic products RUBB 14 43 
Steel ,Non-ferrous metal STEEL 23 63 
Processing 
and assembly 
industry 
Electric product ELEC 78 30 
Industrial Machine MACHINE 49 68 
Precision instrument PREC 38 24 
Transportation equipment TRANS 39 69 
Source: Author created
  
                                                 
1 Seven new industry sectors are added. 
2 Expansion of the TRI to gather chemical use information and Expansion of the EPA Community Right-to-Know Program to 
increase the information available to the public on chemical use. 
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Table 3. Contribution ratio for inefficiency score of U.S. manufacturing companies 
  Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
B
asic m
aterial in
d
u
stry
 
CHEMI 
COST of SALE 5% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
CAPITAL 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
LABOR 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
SALE 42% 41% 45% 45% 43% 40% 45% 42% 43% 
TOXIC 48% 50% 47% 46% 49% 51% 46% 49% 48% 
METAL 
COST of SALE 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
CAPITAL 19% 10% 11% 13% 12% 14% 12% 13% 13% 
LABOR 8% 5% 3% 3% 2% 2% 4% 2% 2% 
SALE 30% 12% 11% 16% 13% 14% 13% 10% 9% 
TOXIC 42% 71% 72% 66% 72% 69% 70% 74% 74% 
PAPER 
COST of SALE 10% 11% 13% 7% 2% 3% 2% 2% 0% 
CAPITAL 1% 1% 1% 5% 14% 12% 13% 12% 9% 
LABOR 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 1% 3% 1% 0% 
SALE 6% 10% 14% 18% 14% 12% 14% 13% 12% 
TOXIC 79% 74% 68% 64% 68% 72% 69% 73% 79% 
RUBB 
COST of SALE 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 11% 9% 9% 8% 
CAPITAL 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
LABOR 6% 5% 5% 5% 3% 1% 3% 3% 3% 
SALE 9% 7% 8% 9% 5% 3% 3% 8% 7% 
TOXIC 73% 76% 76% 75% 81% 83% 82% 79% 80% 
STEEL 
COST of SALE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CAPITAL 10% 8% 9% 10% 9% 11% 8% 10% 8% 
LABOR 14% 13% 13% 12% 12% 16% 11% 13% 11% 
SALE 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 2% 1% 
TOXIC 72% 73% 73% 74% 74% 70% 78% 75% 79% 
P
ro
cessin
g
 an
d
 assem
b
ly
 in
d
u
stry
 
ELEC 
COST of SALE 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
CAPITAL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
LABOR 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 
SALE 66% 62% 59% 62% 57% 53% 48% 46% 46% 
TOXIC 26% 30% 33% 30% 35% 39% 43% 43% 44% 
MACHINE 
COST of SALE 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
CAPITAL 11% 13% 13% 12% 12% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
LABOR 8% 10% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
SALE 39% 32% 32% 28% 27% 23% 22% 20% 20% 
TOXIC 41% 45% 44% 50% 50% 55% 54% 57% 57% 
PREC 
COST of SALE 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
CAPITAL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 4% 7% 
LABOR 6% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 8% 8% 9% 
SALE 60% 52% 43% 44% 45% 38% 34% 32% 36% 
TOXIC 31% 37% 45% 46% 45% 52% 54% 56% 49% 
TRANS 
COST of SALE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CAPITAL 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 11% 10% 9% 11% 
LABOR 12% 13% 14% 13% 13% 12% 11% 10% 10% 
SALE 3% 4% 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 3% 2% 
TOXIC 72% 70% 68% 68% 68% 73% 74% 77% 77% 
Source: Author created
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Table 4. Contribution ratio for inefficiency score of Japanese manufacturing companies 
  Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
CHEMI 
COST of SALE 7% 7% 8% 9% 9% 10% 9% 10% 
CAPITAL 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
LABOR 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
SALE 65% 63% 61% 58% 56% 50% 47% 45% 
TOXIC 26% 27% 28% 30% 32% 36% 40% 42% 
METAL 
COST of SALE 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 4% 3% 
CAPITAL 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 7% 5% 
LABOR 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 
SALE 36% 33% 33% 29% 26% 21% 18% 46% 
TOXIC 53% 56% 56% 58% 60% 63% 68% 45% 
PAPER 
COST of SALE 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 2% 2% 
CAPITAL 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
LABOR 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
SALE 22% 21% 22% 22% 17% 16% 6% 4% 
TOXIC 67% 69% 69% 69% 72% 74% 87% 87% 
RUBB 
COST of SALE 8% 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 5% 5% 
CAPITAL 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 
LABOR 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
SALE 50% 49% 42% 38% 36% 30% 29% 25% 
TOXIC 40% 40% 45% 48% 51% 55% 59% 63% 
STEEL 
COST of SALE 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
CAPITAL 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
LABOR 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 7% 9% 
SALE 39% 38% 38% 33% 37% 32% 21% 26% 
TOXIC 53% 54% 54% 58% 55% 61% 67% 61% 
P
ro
cessin
g
 an
d
 assem
b
ly
 in
d
u
stry
 
ELEC 
COST of SALE 5% 5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 11% 12% 
CAPITAL 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
LABOR 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
SALE 70% 67% 59% 53% 44% 37% 36% 32% 
TOXIC 24% 26% 32% 35% 42% 47% 50% 51% 
MACHINE 
COST of SALE 4% 6% 6% 7% 8% 7% 8% 8% 
CAPITAL 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
LABOR 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 
SALE 54% 49% 48% 41% 37% 37% 20% 19% 
TOXIC 40% 43% 45% 50% 53% 54% 70% 69% 
PREC 
COST of SALE 6% 7% 8% 9% 6% 7% 2% 4% 
CAPITAL 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
LABOR 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
SALE 35% 34% 28% 26% 30% 26% 30% 29% 
TOXIC 54% 54% 58% 60% 60% 63% 65% 64% 
TRANS 
COST of SALE 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
CAPITAL 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
LABOR 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 5% 6% 8% 
SALE 36% 34% 32% 30% 27% 23% 12% 7% 
TOXIC 57% 59% 60% 63% 65% 68% 78% 81% 
Source: Author created 
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Figure 1. Inefficiency score change of U.S. basic material industry from 1999 to 2007 
Source: Author created 
 
Figure 2. Inefficiency score change of U.S. processing and assembly industry from 1999 
to 2007 
Source: Author created 
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Figure 3. Inefficiency score change of Japanese basic material industry from 1999 to 
2007 
 Source: Author created 
 
Figure 4. Inefficiency score change of Japanese processing and assembly industry from 
1999 to 2007 Source: Author created
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